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ASSIGN MENTS-PARTIAL ASSIGNMENTS-VALIDITY.-CROSS V. PAGE &
-ILL Co., 133 N. W., 178, (MINN.).-Held, that though, where a debtor
-refuses to recognize an assignment, an independent action by the assignee
2gainst the debtor will not lie when only a part of the debt was assigned,
,the rule does not apply where the debtor on notice does not object.
An assignment of a chose in action is valid as between the assignor
;and assignee, notice to the debtor being necessary only in order to avoid
-postponement in favor of subsequent assignees for value. Jackson v.
Harm,,, 14 Colo., 58; Board of Education v. Duparquet, 50 N. J. Eq., 234;
Phillip's Est., 205 Pa., 515. But it is a well established rule of courts of
law that an assignment of a part only is void unless made with the consent
,or ratification of the debtor. Mllandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. (U. S.), 277;
Getchell v. Maney, 69 Me., 442; Carter v. Nichols, 58 Vt., 553. The
i-eason being that it is unfair to the debtor to allow a creditor to split up
'his causes of action into many parts, the assignment may be held good as
.against the assignor while void as to the debtor, or if no injury can accrue
-to the debtor it may be valid. Gibson v. Cooke, 20 Pick. (Mass.), 15; Canty
v. Latterner, 31 Minn., 239; Smith v. Oldham, 5 Mo., 483. This reason
'being of no force in equity, the weight of authority supports an assign-
.ment pro tanto in equity. Pomeroy's Equity Jurisp., Sec. 169, 1280; National
,Exch. Bank v. McLoon, 73 Me., 498; Moody v. Kyle, 34 Miss., 506; Peugh
,. Porter, 112 U. S., 737. Contra, Gibson v. Finley, 4 Md. Ch., 75; Burnett
-v. Crandall, 63 Mo., 410. Equitable partial assignments are also enforced
in admiralty. The Elnbank, 72 Fed., 610. But vague and indefinite par-
-tial assignments, as bills of exchange and uncertified checks, are generally
-not valid in equity without the consent of the debtor. Story v. Hull, 143
Ill., 506; Covert v. Rhodes, 48 Ohio St., 66; Christmas v. Russell, 14 Wall.
(U. S.), 69. Contra, Gordon v. Muchler, 34 La. Ann., 604. The equit-
able doctrine is now recognized in many states in law actions. Grain v.
Aldrich, 38 Cal., 514; Brown v. Dunn, 50 N. J. L., 111; Risley v. Phenix
Bank, 83 N. Y., 318. The doctrine at law being for the benefit of the
-debtor, there is no reason why a partial assignment should not be good
when he assents. 2 Story, Equity Jurisp., Sec. 1043; Marsiou v. Pioche,
-8 Cal., 536; Bourne v. Cabot, 13 Metc. (Mass.), 305; St. Louis Bank v.
Noonan, 88 Mo., 377.
CORPORATIONs-AcTs OF OFFICERS-PRIVATE TRANSACTIONs.-GREG-
MOORE ORCHARD Co. v. GILMfOUR, 140 S. W. Pup. 763(Mo.).-Held, knowl-
-edge which comes to an officer of a corporation through his private trans-
actions, and beyond the range of his official duties, is not notice to the cor-
poration, though the officer obtaining the knowledge is at the time the
,corporation's managing agent.
The general rule is that notice of a fact acquired by an agent while
,acting for his principal, operates constructively as notice to the principal.
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This doctrine applies- with particular force to corporations. Frenkel v.
Hudson, 82 Ala., 158. In a strict sense a corporation, from its nature,
can only have constructive notice, or knowledge of facts. Plumb v. Fuit,
2 Anstr., 432. The most comprehensive rule is that notice communicated
to or knowledge acquired-by the officers, or agents, of a corporation, when
acting in their official capacity, or within the scope of their agency becomes
notice to the corporation, for all purposes. Bridgeport Bank v. New York,
etc., R. R. Co., 30 Conn., 231. Generally speaking notice will not be imputed
to the principal unless the knowledge of the facts reaches the agent while
acting for the principal. Armstrong v. Abbott, 11 Colo., 220. So infor-
mation communicated to an officer of a corporation on the street touching
a matter affecting the rights of a corporation is not as a matter of law
notice to the corporation. Texas Banking Co. v. Hutchins, 53 Texas, 61.
Cases are found which hold that although knowledge of a fact comes to.
an agent while not acting for the principal, yet if he subsequently acted
for his principal, in a matter in which it was his duty to communicate the
fact, then this knowledge will be imputed to his principal. Tagg v. Tenn.
Natl. Bank, 9 Heisk. (Tenn.), 479. The material fact, therefore, which-
binds the principal is the knowledge which the agent possesses at the time
he acts, and the principal is bound in such cases, whether the knowledge
is communicated or not. Harrington v. U. S., 11 Wall, 356. This doctrine.
is followed in England. Dressor v. Norwood, 17 C. B. N. S. One of the
courts in this country has gone further, and held that, where the fact of
the agency is established, knowledge acquired a short time prior to his
appointment necessarily gives rise to the inference that it remained fixed
in his memory when he entered the employment, and therefore must be
deemed knowledge of his principal. Choutean v. Allen, 70 Mo., 290; Hay-
ward v. Natl. Ins. Co., 52 Mo., 181.
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS-POWERS OF SECRETARY.-CITY OF CHICAGO 1%
STEIN, 96 N. E., 886 (ILL.).-Held, that the secretary of a corporation as
a rule does not have the power ex officio to bind the corporation by letters
and documents officially signed by him.
The secretary of an incorporated company is an officer of the com-
pany. Ehrenzeller v. Union Canal Co., I Rawle (Pa.), 181. The power of
an officer of a corporation to bind his principal is governed by the law of
agency. Moore v. Manufacturing Co., 113 Mo., 453. Thus a secretary
may have express powers granted to him, or he may have implied powers.
to bind the corporation. Read v. Buffum, 79 Cal., 77; Peck v. Insurance
Co., 22 Conn., 575. Moreover a corporation may ratify the acts of a secre-
tary which are without the scope of his authority. New England Marine'
Insurance Co. v. DeWolf, 8 Pick. (Mass.), 56; Burch v. West, 134 II., 258;
Elwell v. Railroad Co., 67 Barb. (N. Y.) 83. However a corpoiation is.
not estopped to deny the authority of the secretary in respect to all acts.
which it has not expressly or impliedly clothed him to perform in its.
behalf. Winsted Hosiery Co. v. New Britain Knitting Co., 69 Conn., 565.
The true test to be applied to the secretary's ability to bind the corporation
is to inquire whether or not he is engaged in the general duties of his-
RECENT CASES
office. Hastings v. Brooklyni Life Insurance Ca., 138 N. Y., 473; Williams
v. Chester R. R. Co., 5 Eng. L. & Eq., 497.
CORPORATIONS-RECEIVERS-GROUNDS OF APPOINTIENT-MISCONDUCT
OF CORPORATE OFFICERS-ADEQUACY OF OTHER REMEDY.-SMITH V. Bni-
]AINGHAME DISINFECTANT Co., 56 S. W., 721 (ALA.) --Held, misappropria-
tion of corporate assets by the officers is not ground for the appointment
of a receiver, if the officers are solvent.
Receivers are appointed to protect and preserve the property under
consideration. High on Receivers, Sec. 1, 3, 5, 6; Barker v. Admr. of
Backen, 32 II1., 79. Receivers are not appointed as a punishment for a
past dereliction, but are appointed when present conditions and the pros-
pect for the future are such as to warrant the taking of the property out
of the hands of the owners. Klan v. Colt, I Hast. Let., 365; Beecher v.
Bininger, I Blatchf., 170; Bank v. Gage, 79 Ill., 207. Courts proceed with
extreme caution in appointing receivers to take property of a corporation
out of the control of its officers, when there is any other remedy. Oqckley
v. Paterson, I Greens Ch., 173; Hyde Park Gas Co. v. Kerber, 5 Brad.,
132. Circumstances to justify such appointment must be extraordinary,
and something more must be shown than past misconduct, or mere appre-
hension. Waterbury v. Al. U. Ex. Co., 50 Brad. (N. Y.), 157. In accord
with the principal case, the courts hold that where none of the directors
are shown to be insolvent there is no reason for thinking that the
amount due the corporation will not be accounted for. Original Vienna
Bakery, etc. v. Heissler, 50 Ill. App., 406. The proper remedy is either
an action at law for damages, or a bill in equity for an accounting. Mobile,
etc. Bank v. Collins, 7 Ala., 95; Citizens Loan Assoc. v. Lyon, 29 N. J. Eq.,
110.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-DEFENSE OF DURESS.-STATE V. MORETTI,
120 PAc., 102 (WAsH.).-Held, that participation in a robbery by the
accused under duress was not a defense in the prosecution for murder
where the person robbed was killed by an associate of the accused.
The law is settled that all co-participators are liable in a prosecution
for murder where the deceased was killed during the commission of a
felony. Simpson v. State, 59 Ala., 1. Duress threatening danger to prop-
erty or slight personal injury is no defense to a crime. Clark/s Criminal
Law, p. 92. Compulsion threatening immediate danger of death or violent
personal injury wil excuse minor crimes. Kenny, Out. of Crim. Law, 67.
And some authorities hold that it is a defense to murder if the duress is of
such an irresistible nature that immediate death -is imminent. State v.
Nargashian, 26 R. I., 299; United States v. Vigol, 2 U. S., (2 Dall), 340.
But it is generally established that no duress excuses murder. Blackstone,
4th Com., 30. However in a few jurisdictions it is intimated that duress
may reduce the grade of a crime. Brewer v. State, 72 Ark., 145; Rizzolo
v. Commonwealth, 126 Penn., 54. Coercion exercised by a husband does
not excuse his wife from murder, Bibb v. Stadte, 94 Ala., 31, but under
an Arkansas statute the contra has been held. Edwards v. State, 27 Ark.,
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459. However children under fourteen years of age may offer duress
as a defense for heinous crimes. People v. Miller, 66 Cal., 468.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-LEGATEES-RECOVERY OF FORFEITED
LEGAcIES.-KELLEY V. WINSLOW, 131 N. Y. Surr., 65.-Held, that as money
improperly paid by an executrix may be recovered back, the payment of
a legacy bequeathed by plaintiff's testator to defendant upon condition that
it should be forfeited if defendant in any way contested the will, did not
defeat the condition, but after the breach by the defendant bringing action
to have the will declared void, after receiving the legacy, the parties were
in the same position they would have been had not the legacy been paid,
and plaintiff might recover it.
The delivery of possession by an executor or administrator closes the
administration so far as he is concerned. Larne v. White & McKoin, 38
'Ky., 45; Barton v. Burbank, 114 La., 224; Palner v. Whitney, 166 Mass.,
306. Therefore an executor may be held personally liable to a creditor.
Beaird v. Wolf, 23 Ill. App., 486; James v. West, Adm'r., 67 Ohio St., 30;
Gallego's Ex'ors v. Att. Gen., 3 Leigh (Va.), 450. Or to a legatee recov-
ering on breach of condition. Ferguson v. Epes, 77 Va., 499. But an
executor has been allowed recovery of overpayment to a creditor, when
it afterward develops that the estate is insolvent. Alexander v. Fisher &
Wife, 18 Ala., 374; Mansfield v. Lynch, 59 Conn., 320; Tarplee v. Capp,
25 Ind. App., 56. And recovery has been alowed on overpayment in
other circumstances, as honest mistakes in distribution. Culbreath v. Cul-
breath, 7 Ga., 69; Lyle v. Siler, 103 N. C., 261. Hodges v. Waddington,
2 Vent., 360, allowed recovery by the other legatees, but not by the execu-
tor. However, some courts do not allow the executor to recover. Brook-
ing v. Farmers' Bank, 83 Ky., 431; Hoffnan v. Armstrong, 90 Md., 123;
Johnson v. Weir, 70 N. Y. Supp., 1020; Findlay v. Trigg, 83 Va., 539.
These decisions, except in the case of inequitable conduct on the part of
the executor, seem to rest on the theory, criticized by textwriters, that a
mistake of law is not ground for recovery. Woodward on Mistake of
Law, 5 Columbia L. Rev., 366; Keener on Quasi-Contracts, 90-91. Money
paid to the wrong person has been held irrecoverable as a mistake of law.
Phillips v. McConica, 59 Ohio St., 1. But it would seem that the prin-
cipal case is justified in allowing recovery on the ground that breach
-of a condition is not a mistake of law. Heard v. Drake, 4 Gray, 514;
Hathaway v. County of Delaware, 185 N. Y., 368.
EXPLOSIVES-INJURIES TO PROPERTY FROM% BLASTING-LIABILITY.-
ADLER i. Fox, 132 N. Y. SuPP., 302.-Held, that where the plaintiff's water
pipe was broken by the falling in of a large section of rock above it, due
to defendant's blasting operations in a near-by trench, defendant was not
liable in trespass, if the rock merely fell from concussion and not as a
direct result of the blast, as by being hurled against the pipe.
It may be said to be the rule that one who in blasting upon his prem-
ises casts rocks or other debris upon the land of another is liable for such
invasion, regardless of the degree of skill or care used in doing the work.
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Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y., 159; Fitz Simons & Connell Co. v. Braun
& Fitts, 94 Ill. App., 533; Langshorne v. Wilson, 28 Ky. Law, 1181. A
distinction is recognized in some jurisdictions between an injury caused
by blasting debris directly upon the property of another, and by injuring
it by vibrations in the air or earth, courts holding in the latter case that
it is necessary to show negligence in the execution of the work to permit
a recovery. Benner v. Atlantic Dredging Co., 134 N. Y., 156. But, when
for the purpose of lawfully making use of or improving land it becomes
necessary to resort to blasting as the only practicable method of doing so,
the owner will not be liable for consequential damages to neighboring
property unless he has failed to exercise due care in the performance of
the work. Booth v. Rome, etc. Ry. Co., 140 N. Y.,267. In order for a
liability to exist for an injury caused by blasting it is not necessary that
there should be an actual invasion of the premises injured; it is imma-
terial whether the injury results from the direct attack of broken rock or
from the concussion caused by the blasting. Morgan v. Bowes, 17 N. Y.
Supp., 22. Where, however, the injury is not caused by the direct force
of the explosion at all, liability can hardly be attached to those using the
explosive, unless positive negligence can be imputed to their work. Fitz
Simons & Connell Co. v. Braun & Fitts, 94 Ill. App., 533. A person
engaged in the dangerous occupation of blasting is always liable for
injuries, however remote, when negligence can be proved on his part.
Louisville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Bonhayo, 94 Ky., 67.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-POSITION OF SIGNATURE-VALIDITY.--LEE V.
VAUGHAN SEED STORE, 141 S. W., (ARK.), 496.-FIeld, that defendant's name
printed in the body and on the back of a blank order for goods received
by its agent did not constitute a signature within Kirby's Dig., Sec. 3656,
requiring certain contracts to be evidenced by a signed note or memo-
randum.
The English and American courts almost universally hold that a mark,
initials or printed name is sufficient to constitute a signature if intended as
such. Bickley v. Keenan, 60 Ala., 293; Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 B. & P.,
238. The position of the signature is immaterial unless regulated by
statute. Wise v. Ray, 3 Green (Ia.), 431; New England Meat Co. v.
Standard Worsted Co., 165 Mass., 331. However, the signature must
authenticate every material part of the instrument. Benjanin on Sales,
Sec. 259. But a late English decision has held that a signature to a docu-
ment which contains the terms of a contract satisfies the Statute of Frauds
though put alio intuitu and not in order to attest or verify the contract.
Griffth's Cycle Co. v. Humber, 2 Q. B., 418 (1899). And a printed bill-
head was held to amount to a signature although not intended for that
purpose but accepted as such by the party charged. Schneider v. Norris,
2 M. & S., 286. Where a statute requires the name to be subscribed it
must be placed at the end of the document. Coon v. Rigden, 4 Colo., 282;
McGivern v. Flemting, 66 How. Prac., 300 (N. Y.). But under a statute
requiring a subscription, the name written across the face of the instru-
ment, because of lack of room at the bottom, was held to be subscribed.
California Canneries Co. v. Scatena, 117 Cal., 447.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE-ALIENATION OF AFFECTION-LIABILITY 
OF
PARENTS FRONK v. FRONK ET AL., 141 S. W. (Mo.), 692.-Held, to make-
the parents of plaintiff's husband liable for alienation of his affection 
it
is not enough as in the case of a stranger to show interference by them,
as malice on their part will not be inferred; but it must be-shown that
their conduct was not such as should be characterized as a natural result
of parental solicitude, but amounted to a clear case of want of reasonable
justification.
All authorities are agreed that parents will not be liable to the wife-
for causing the alienation of her husband's affection or vice versa, if they
act in good faith and without malice. Huling v. Huling, 32 Ill. App., 519;
Holtz v. Dick, 42 Ohio St., 23; Rice v. Rice, 104 Mich., 371; Glass v. Ben-
nett, 89 Tenn., 478; Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C., 19. Of course, the par-
ents' right of interference is not absolute and if they act unjustifiably in
bringing about a separation, they will be held liable as if they were
strangers. Davis v. Petty, 147 Mo., 374; Lockwood v. Lockwood, 67 Minn.,
476; Price v. Price, 91 Ia., 693. But bad or unworthy motives will
not be presumed from the act of interference. They must be positively-
shown or necessarily deduced from the circumstances. Hutcheson v. Peck,
5 Johns., 196; Eagon v. Eagon, 60 Kans., 697; Zimmerman v. Whitely, 134
Mich., 39. The law recognizes a superior right of interference on the
part of parents; and will justify interference for causes which would be-
no justification in favor of another person. Multer v. Knibbs, 193 Mass.,
556; Barton v. Barton, 119 Mo. App., 507. And though the information
might subsequently prove to have been unfounded, if he acted from pure-
motives, he is not liable. Oakman v. Belden, 94 Me., 280; Tucker v. Tucker,
74 Mo., 93; Payne v. Williams, 4 Baxt., 583. The wife may have the-
action though she continues to live with her husband. Foot v. Card, 58
Conn., 1. And it is held that she may maintain it after a divorce from
him. Postlewaite v. Postlewaite, 1 Ind. App., 473; Beach v. Brown, 20.
Wash., 266.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND-DEBTS CONTRACTED 
BY
WIFE.-MENSCHKE V. RILEY, 140 S. W., 639 (Mo.) .- Held, that a husband
who had by due notice forbidden certain tradesmen to trust his wife was
not liable on her contracts with them if he had previously made arrange--
ments for the supplying of her with necessaries.
The general American rule agrees with the case under discussion andy
holds that a husband has a right to prohibit certain persons from trusting
his wife and, if he has already supplied her with necessaries, notice to that
effect-is effectual against any presumption which cohabitation raises. Keller
v,.'Phillips, 39 N. Y., 351; Defenidorf v. Emerson, 66 Iowa, 698. But if'
the'goods are necessaries and the husband has not supplied them, he is
liable, though he expressly forbade the tradesman to trust her. Woodward
V Barnes, 43 Vt., 330; Cromwell v. Benjamin, 41 Barb. (N. Y.), 558. To-
bind a husband the plaintiff must show affirmatively that the husband'
failed to supply the necessaries. Barr v. Armstrong, 56 Mo., 577. A hus-
band is liable on such contracts even though he married his wife unwill-
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ingly. State v. Russell, 41 Conn., 433. If a man marry a widow he is not
bound on contracts for the support of her children. Attridge v. Billings,
57 Ill., 489. If a husband's misconduct compels his wife to leave him he
is still liable on her contracts. Hnltz v. Gibbs, 66 Pa. State, 360; Pierpont
v. Wilson, 49 Conn., 350. Though the pair be separated by agreement,
if there .be no allowance for her or if it fail or be insufficient, he is liable-
Pearson v. Darrington, 32 AL., 227; Ross v. Ross, 69 Ill., 569.
JUDICIAL SALES-VACATING----INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION.-MANGOLD V
BACON, 141 S. W. (Mo.), 650.-Held, equity will set aside a sheriff's sale
on the sole ground that the consideration received was so grossly inade-
qiate as to shock the conscience, even if there are no other equitable con-
siderations authorizing its vacation.
It is well established that as a general rule, a judicial sale will not be
set aside on account of mere inadequacy in the price realized. Parker v.
Bluffton Car Wheel Co., 108 Ala., 140; Harman v. Copenhaver, 89 Va.,
836; Babcock v. Canfield, 36 Kans., 437; Dircks v. Logsdon, 59 Md., 173;
Obrien v. Hilburn, 22 Tex., 616. But if the inadequacy of the price
obtained be so gross as to shock the conscience of the Court, the sale will
be set aside. Blanks v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 122 Fed., 849; Coles v. Coles,
83 Va., 525; Daly v. Ely, 51 N. J. Eq., 104. Then by other courts the sale
may be set aside where inadequacy is so great as to raise a presumption of
fraud. Quick v. Collins, 197 Ill., 391; Johnson v. Avery, 60 Minn., 262. Or
when in connection with the inadequacy of price there are other circum-
stances having a tendency to cause such inadequacy or any apparent unfair-
ness or impropriety the sale may be set aside. Beck v. May, 163 Ill., 547;
Wood v. Drury, 56 Kans., 409. And the greater such inadequacy of price,
the slighter may be the circumstances of fraud, accident or mistake.
Schroeder v. Young, 161 W. S., 334; Bean v. Haffendorfer, 84 Ky., 685
It is also well settled that inadequacy of price will have a great influence
towards inducing a court to set aside a judicial sale where the objection,
is for setting aside the sale after confirmation. Jennings v. Dumphy, 174,
I11., 86; Branch v. Griffin, 99 N. C., 173. But a court of chancery cannot
set aside a public sale regularly made by an officer not acting under its.
direction, notwithstanding the price was grossly inadequate. March v.
Ludlun 3 Sandf. (N. Y.), 38.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-LIBELOUS WORDS PER SE--"LIBEL".-CoHEN V.,
NEW YORK TInIES Co., 132 N. Y. Sum.,- 1-Held, that it is libelous per se-
to publish of a living person that he is dead, because exposing him to.
ridicule; a libel being a malicious publication tending to expose one to.
public hatred, contempt or ridicule.
A libel is a malicious publication, expressed either in printing or in-
writing, or by signs and pictures tending either to blacken the memory of-
one dead or the reputation of one who is alive, and expose him to public-
hatred, contempt or ridicule. Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass., 163.' The
enjoyment of a private reputation unassailed is as much a constitutional
right as the right to life, liberty and property. Park v. Detroit Free Press-
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Pub. Co., 72 Mich., 560. The law will presume general damage to result
from the publication of defamatory matter, although no actual pecuniary
loss has in fact resulted, Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan., 670, the words from
which the law presumes injury in such case being deemed actionable per se.
Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 35 Minn., 251. Accordingly, it may be stated
as a general proposition that words written or printed may be libelous and
actionable per se, that is actionable without any allegations of special 
dam-
ages, if they tend to expose the plaintiff to public hatred, contempt, ridi-
cule or aversion, and to induce an evil opinion of him in the minds of right
thinking persons, and to deprive him of their friendly intercourse and
society, even though the same words if spoken would not have been action-
able. Farley v. Evening Chronicle Pub. Co., 113 Mo. App., 216; Obaugh v.
Finn, 4 Ark., 110. In order to be libelous per se it is not essential that the
words should contain an imputation of crime, Gallagher v. Bryant, 44 N. Y.
App. Div., 527, nor is scandalous matter necessary to make a libel. Watson
v. Trask, 6 -Ohio, 531. Mere" general abuse and scurrility, however ill-
natured and vexatious, is no more actionable when written than when
spoken, if it does not convey degrading charges or imputations. Rice v.
Simmons, 2 Harr. (Del.), 417. Some courts hold that malice is not a
necessary ingredient to a cause of action for libel or slander. Cady v.
Brooklyn Union Pub. Co., 51 N. Y. Supp., 198. But in all courts the law
implies malice from the publication of words actionable per se, and no
actual malice is essential to a recovery. Mllitchell v. Milholland, 106 Ill., 175;
Owen s,. Dewey, 107 Mich., 67.
.LIBEL AND SLANDER-PRIVLEGED CO1ITIUNICATIONs-IscHARGE OF
DUTY TO PUBLIC.-BINGHA-1 v. GAYNOR, 96 N. E., 84 (N. Y.).-Held, that
a communication concerning a public official, made to his superior or
person empowered to redress a wrong, is privileged, though the statements
are untrue, where the person making them acts in good faith and has 
a
legal or moral duty as a citizen or otherwise to make such communication.
To comment upon the acts or conduct of a public man is the right 
of
every citizen. Duffy v. N. Y. Evening Post Co., 96 N. Y. Supp., 629. 
No
action for libel or slander lies for a petition or remonstrance 
imputing
want of integrity or other cause of unfitness to a public officer or 
employee,
subject to removal by or under the supervision of the officer or 
board to
whom the communication is addressed, provided such communication 
be
made in good faith and without malice. Kent v. Bongartz, 15 
R. I., 72;
Frank v. Dessena, 5 N. J. Law J., 185. But to come within this 
rule the
officer or board addressed must have some interest or duty in the matter.
,Hebditch v. McIlwaine, 2 Q. B., 54 (1894); Erber s,. Dun, 12 Fed., 
526.
But the right to criticize does not embrace the right to make false 
state-
ments of fact, to ittack the private character of an officer, or to 
falsely
impute to him malfeasance or misconduct in office. Negley v. Farrow, 
60
id., 158. In some jurisdictions, however, it is held that even though the
statements are not strictly true, the defendant is not liable if there 
was
probable cause for the statements and no proof of express 
malice. O'Ronrke
v. Lesiston Daily Sun Pub. Co., 89 Me., 310.
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NEGLIGENCE-INJURY TO THEATRE PATRON-RES IPSA LOQUITUR.-
GOLDSTEIN V. LEvy, 132 N. Y. Supp., 373.-Held, that the falling of a shade
from a chandelier in a theatre whereby a patron was injured, being an
unusual accident, negligence on the part of the proprietor is presumed.
The principal case is similar to others where the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur has been applied. Excelsior Co. v. Sweet, 57 N. J. L., 224; Boyd v.
Portland, 41 Ore., 336; Chenall v. Palmer, 117 Ga., 106. But if there is
any other cause to which the injury may be attributed the presumption will
not hold. Zahneiyer v. Penn. Corp., 190 Pa. St., 350; Railroad v. Reilly, 212
Ill., 506. But where the injury might have been due to the negligence of
several distinct persons, the guilty party must be proven. Wolf v. Am.
Tract. Assn., 104 N. Y., 30. Ordinarily the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove a violation of a duty. Murphy v. Greely, 146 Mass., 196. A pre-
sumption of negligence on the part of the proprietor arises with the injury
but it may be overcome by showing due care on his part. Welch v. Durand,
31 Conn., 182; Buch v. Barnett, 96 Cal., 202.
TAXATION-RIGHT TO ENFORCE.-STATE EX REL. KOELN, COLLECTOR, V.
LESSER, 141 S. W., (Mo.), 888.-Held, that there can be no lawful collec-
tion of a tax until there is a lawful assessment, except in the manner pre-
scribed by law, and of property designated by law for that purpose.
The assessment is an indispensable prerequisite to the validity of a tax
against any individual; for.vithout a valid assessment there can be no
lawful attempt to collect the tax or to enforce it against any specific prop-
erty. Worthington v. Whitman, 67 Iowa, 190; Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Nebr.,
236. Mere irregularities in the assessment will not affect its validity, but
only such defects as go to the jurisdiction of the assessors, or deprive
the taxpayers of some substantial right. Greenville v. Blair, 104 Me., 444.
It is also notable that a statute passed to cure defects and irregularities in
tax proceedings will not cure a want of assessment. People v. Holladay,
25 Calif., 300. It has been held that in order to make a valid assessment
there must be an exact compliance with the manner prescribed by law,
Hough v. North Adams, 196 Mass., 290, but where the statutory provisions
relating to a levy have for their object merely the information of the
assessors, and intend to promote dispatch and system, they are directory
only, and a failure to comply with such requirements does not invalidate
the levy. State Auditor v. Jackson County, 65 Ala., 142; Atlanta Nat. Bldg.
Association v. Stewart, 109 Ga., 80. If, on the other hand, the statutory
provisions relating to the levy have for their object the protection of the
taxpayer against spoliation or excessive taxation they are mandatory and
must be followed. State Auditor v. Jackson County, 65 Ala., 142. Finally,
all property within the jurisdiction of a state is subject to its taxing powers,
except where specifically exempted, People v. Ravenswood Hospital, 238
Ill., 137, Wolfe County v. Beckett, 127 Ky., 252, but, no property is liable
to assessment under a particular tax law unless named or described in it,
State Tax Commissioners v. Holliday, 150 Ind., 216, and only that which
may properly be termed property is subject to a property tax. Arapahoe
County 7: Rocky Mountain News Printing Co., 15 Colo. App., 189.
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TORTs-CIviL RIGHTS-RIGHTS OF PRIVACY.-BINNS v. Ai.ERICAN 
VITA-
GRAPH Co., 132 N. Y., Sup'., 237.-Held, that where one is greatly disturbed
in his mind and his feelings are injured by the unlawful use of his name
and picture he may recover exemplary damages. McLaughlin, J., dissent-
ing.
The common law regards the person as inviolate and recognizes one's
right to be let alone. Cooley on Torts, p. 29; Harvard Law Review, Dec.
15, 1890. The mere fact that the cause of an injury is novel does not
leave it without a remedy.Kiyek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y., 176. There is
authority in support of the principle case, Marks v. Jaffa, 6 N. Y. Misc.,
290, and the English courts are in accord with the doctrine. Tuck v.
Priester, 192 B. D., 639 (1887); Prince Albert v. Strang, 1 Masn., 825;
Pollard v. Photograph Co., 40 Ch. Div., 345 (1888). By the great weight
of opinion relatives cannot collect damages for injuries to their feelings
through the publishing of pictures of their dead. Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed.,
434; Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich., 372; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y.,
434.
WILLs-NUNCUPATVE WILL.-lITCHELL V. STANTON, 139 S. W., 1034
(TEx.).-Held, a nuncupative will does not pass title to realty.
A nuncupative will is one that is not in writing ,and exists only when
the testator declares his will orally before a sufficient number of witnesses,
while he is in his last sickness. Estate of Miller, 47 Wash., 253; Wiley's
Estate, 187 Pa., 82. The doctrine of nuncupative will is derived from the
civil law and was incorporated into the common law, before the statute of
wills. Prince v. Hazleton, 20 Johns., 519. It was a common mode of
devising property among seamen, sailors, and soldiers in service. These
devises and bequests were usually of personalty, or realty of small amounts.
Lewis v. Aylott, 45 Texas, 190. The words spoken to constitute a nun-
cupative will must manifest an intent to make a will, and must be spoken
in extremis. Sykes v. Sykes, 2 Stew., 364; Morgan v. Steves, 78 Ill., 287.
It is well established that personal property may be bequeathed by a nun-
cupative will. Godfrey v. Smith, 73 Neb., 756. In some states, under statu-
tory provisions realty may be devised by a nuncupative will. Gillis v. Wriller,
10 Ohio, 463. The weight of authority however is that realty cannot be
Olevised by a nuncupative will. Paincr v. Palmer, 2 D na, 390; Pierce v.
Pierce, 46 Ind., 86.
WILLS-WILL OF MARRIED WOMAN-CONSENT OF HUSBAND.-ERICKSON
v. ROBERTSON, 133 N. W., 164 (MIN.).-Held, that written consent by
the husband to the devise by the wife of her real property is valid and
effectual without consideration, though given in furtherance of a void
written agreement between husband and wife, by which each, in terms,
released all interest in the other's real property; the wife having performed
her part of the agreement.
At common law the will of a married woman devising her real prop-
erty was void even though made with her husband's consent. 2Bla. Coi.,
RECENT CASES
497, 498; Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day (Conn.), 163; Osgood v. Breed, 12
Mass., 525; Marston v. Norton, 5 N. H., 205. Her will of personal prop-
erty was only valid if the husband consented. George v. Bussing, 54 Ky.,
.558; Lee v. Bennett, 31 Mass., 119; Emery v. Neighbour, 7 N. J. L., 142.
Such consent might be given by parol or might be implied, consideration
being unnecessary. Reed v. Blaisdell, 16 N. H., 194; Webb v. Jones, 36 N.
J. Eq., 163; Fisher v. Kimball, 17 Vt., 323. Under the present enabling
statutes of most of the states a wife may devise all her property, real and
personal, if the husband waive his rights by his consent. Smith v. Sweet,
55 Mass., 470; Beals v. Storm, 20 N. J. Eq., 372; Kurtz v. Saylor, 20 Pa.,
205. Generally such consent, unless given after her death, may be
revoked up to the time of the probate of the will. Redfield on Wills, Par.
4; Newlin v. Freeman, 23 N. C., 514; Van Winkle v. Schoomnaker, 15
N. J. Eq., 384. Wagner's Estate, 2 Ashm. (Pa.), 448, allows revocation.
of consent given after her death, but this is no longer the rule. Schouler,
Husband and Wife, Sec. 458, 459; Maas v. Sheffeld, 1 Rob. Ecc., 364. Now
contracts to make a will are generally valid. Stellnacher v. Bruder, 89
Minn., 507; Gupton v. Gupton, 47 Mo., 37; Van Duyne v. Vreeland, 12
N. J. Eq., 142. And mutual agreements to make wills have been held to
be so far performed that one party cannot withdraw only when the other
party has died after making his will according to agreement. Allen v.
Bronmberg, 147 Ala., 317; Frazier v. Patterson, 243 Ill., 80; Bower v.
Daniel, 198 Mo., 289; Turnipseed v. Sirrine, 57 S. C., 559. But in some
jurisdictions following the common law rule, contracts between husband
and wife concerning realty are absolutely void. Gebb v. Rose, 40 Md., 387;
Jenne v. Marble, 37 Mich., 319; Laird v. Vila, 93 Minn., 45. Therefore
the decision of the principal case, while undoubtedly correct, would seem
to turn, not on any part performance by the wife of a void contract, but
on the fact that the husband did not revoke his consent in time. 1 Jarm.
on Wills, (6 Am. Ed. by Bigelow), 51-54; Cutter v. Butler, 25 N. H., 343;
In re Ormond's Estate, 161 Pa., 543.
